When Did I Begin?- A Reply to Nicholas Tonti-Filippini by Ford, Norman
The Linacre Quarterly
Volume 57 | Number 4 Article 9
November 1990
When Did I Begin?- A Reply to Nicholas Tonti-
Filippini
Norman Ford
Follow this and additional works at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq
Recommended Citation
Ford, Norman (1990) "When Did I Begin?- A Reply to Nicholas Tonti-Filippini," The Linacre Quarterly: Vol. 57: No. 4, Article 9.
Available at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq/vol57/iss4/9
When Did I Begin?-
A Reply to Nicholas Tonti-Filippini 
Rev. Dr. Norman Ford, S.D.B., S.T.L., Ph.D. 
I would like to reply to Nicholas Tonti-Filippini's recent Critical Note on 
my book When Did I Begin? Conception of the Human Individual in 
His/ory, Philosophy and Science (Cambridge University Press, 1988).1 He 
correctly states the thesis that represents the conclusion of my book and 
agrees with much of what I have written . He shows no signs, however, of 
having grasped the thrust of the central line of my reasoning and he fails to 
mention some of my crucial arguments. Rather than refer directly to 
particular sentences of his , I think it would be better to answer his critique of 
my thesis by presenting a brief outline of why I concluded that a human 
individual could not begin before the appearance of the primitive streak 
about 14 days after fertilization. 
In an era of reproductive technology, it is no longer an idle academic 
question to ask when the life of a human individual begins. The answer 
given to this question is relevant to the morality of those methods of 
preventing pregnancy whose action may be abortifacient. It is more 
pressing still to know what is involved when human embryos are frozen in 
some programmes of in vitro fertilization . Debates on the moral status of 
the human embryo and the appropriate legislative action required to give 
due protection to human embryos make it imperative to study the question 
thoroughly for the emergence of the truth. 
An inter-disciplinary approach involving philosophy, scientific em-
bryology and history is required. Science is quite relevant even though it 
more properly pertains to philosophy to determine questions about the 
meaning and beginning of human personhood. Philosophical induction 
cannot afford to neglect any facts of scientific embryology, even though not 
all the scientific facts may be equally significant in the final analysis . 
Whoever wishes to master these issues must become acquainted with both 
disciplines . Laudable pro-life objectives in today's world cannot be 
effectively promoted by unproven statements on when a person begins. A 
responsible search for truth does not undermine Catholic moral teaching 
provided the respect due to early human embryos is upheld . The challenge 
to write convincing arguments to protect human life from conception must 
be taken up seriously for our contemporaries. 
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The Catholic Church's Position 
The Catholic Church has always adopted the commonly accepted well-
informed view of the scientists and philosophers of the day concerning the 
beginning of the human person. At present the Church takes for granted the 
view held by most in the community that the zygote , formed from the union 
of sperm and egg, is a lready a human being but has expressly not committed 
her authority to this affirmation. At the same time the Church rightly 
realizes that wherever there are reasonable doubts about the personal status 
of the early embryo, moral principles, without prejudice to the search for 
truth, require that the human embryo be treated as a person from 
conception. I fully concur with all the teachings of the Instruction "Donum 
Vitae", especially the following passages : 
... T he conclusions of science regarding the human embryo provide valuable 
indications. from which by the use of reason . it is possible to discern that a person 
is already present from the first appearance of human life: how could a living 
human creature not also be a human person? The magisterium of the church has 
expressly not committed its authority concerning this affirmation which properly 
pertains to philosophy, but it constantly reaffirms its moral condemnation of any 
kind of procured abortion. This teaching has not been changed and is 
unchangeable . 
Thus the fruit of human generation, from the first moment of its existence, that 
is to say from the moment the formation of the zygote begins . demands the 
unconditional respect that is morally due to the human being in his[her] bodily and 
spiritual totality. 
A human creature is to be respected and treated as a person from conception ; 
and therefore from that same time his[her] rights as a person must be recognised. 
among which in the first place is the inviolable right to life of each innocent human 
creature.' 
Philosophical Considerations 
Soul and matter are one, constituting the characteristic psychosomatic 
unity of the human individual , a living human body and a unique 
ontological entity. It is not a question of finding out when a human 
individual begins to have personal experiences of his or her worth, or begins 
to be a moral agent after attaining the age of reason. It is not simply a matter 
of establishing when each one's genetic individuality begins. It is well known 
that this occurs at fertilization. It is more a matter offinding out how far one 
can trace back one's identity as the same continuing living body or living 
ontological individual. A living ontological individual is actually organized 
as a distinct heterogeneous being who is not an aggregate of smaller living 
cells nor merely a part of a greater integrated whole. 
Although all the cells in our bodies are genetically identical, each one is 
not a distinct ontological individual. There is only one human individual 
the really exists in the primary sense of actual existence, though there are 
many cells which share in the existence of that single living human being. A 
human person is a distinct living onto logical individual with a truly human 
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nature. A human person cannot exist before the formation of a distinct 
living individual with a truly human nature which retains the same 
ontological identity throughout its successive developmental stages. The 
adult is the same ontological individual as the infant and even the fetus prior 
to birth. It is a question of considering the relevant biological evidence to see 
if there is a stage in embryological development before which there could 
not be an ongoing individual living body with a truly human nature. 
The Case for a Human Person Beginning at Fertilization 
It is commonly held that a human person begins at fertilization when the 
union of the sperm and egg give rise to a single-cell human embryo, a 
zygote , whose unique genetic individuality remains unchanged during 
normal development. Because cell divisons and differentiation required for 
the coordinated development and growth of the human individual are 
programmed from conception, it is argued the zygote already is a human 
individual. These facts, coupled with unidirectional development and 
growth, are thought to suffice to establish the human zygote as the one and 
same living being as the future human adult. According to this account the 
zygote is an actual human individual and not simply a potential human 
person in much the same way as an infant is an actual human person with 
potential to develop to maturity. 
When identical twinning occurs at the two-cell stage either the first 
human individual ceases when it divides and two new human individuals 
begin, or the original human individual continues when a newly formed 
twin begins. There is no logical reason why one living individual cannot give 
origin to another without continuing to exist as the same ontological 
individual. I agree with Tonti-Filippini that it is metaphysically possible for 
an individual to give rise to another individual without ceasing to exist. A 
tree cutting may give rise to another tree of the same type while the original 
tree continues to exist. 
The Case Against a Human Person Beginning at Fertilization 
In my book, I argue philosophically on the basis of evidence drawn from 
scientific embryology that this widely held traditional view may be coherent, 
but not necessarily true. Although the zygote is endowed with human genetic 
individuality and its cell progeny may give rise to a human adult, it does not 
follow that the zygote itself is a human individual. The fact that identical 
twinning may occasionally occur when the zygote divides, raises the question 
whether the zygote is, or is not, a human individual. In theory, abstracting 
from the concrete biological reality, it is possible to argue that the zygote 
retains its ontological identity when it divides to give origin to a second 
identical cell. In this hypothesis, if the zygote already is a human individual, a 
two-celled human individual would be present after the first cleavage, and a 
multicellular human individual throughout subsequent cleavages. 
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Tonti-Filippini does not see why the comparison of the tree with the 
human zygote fails on biological , not metaphysical, grounds. The 
biological structures of the tree and the human zygote reveal the essential 
differences which are relevant to determining whether the original 
individual zygote survives the twinning process when a second identical cell 
begins. It is obvious the central organization and structure of a tree remain 
after a cutting is taken from it. The same applies to a human individual 
when both legs and arms are amputated. Tonti-Filippini is right in saying 
the same person continues despite the loss of these non-vital parts. Likewise 
the ontological identity of a human person is not affected when one 
produces living sperm or eggs which exist for a short time as living 
individuals. A human individual would not cease to be the same entity even 
if it were possible to replicate him / her by producing a clone from one of 
his / her cells. 
Contemporary scientific embryology has established that once the DN A 
content of the 23 pairs of original male and female single thread 
chromosomes is replicated, the fertilized ovum has 23 pairs of double 
threaded male and female chromosomes. After some hours, cell division 
and cleavage begin with the random sharing of the original and replicated 
chromatid threads from each pair, so that the parent cell is no longer 
present once the first two daughter cells are formed. It no longer exists once 
it shares its cytoplasm and chromosomal genetic material to give rise to its 
identical daughter cells of equal age. The analogy of the amoeba serves 
better than that of the tree cutting: 
The case of an amoeba or a bacterial ce ll becoming two by fission would be the 
appropriate analogy to employ in the case of identical twinning in human zygotes. 
The original parent cell loses its ontological individuality and ceases to exist when 
two offspring result from the equal sharing of its genetic material. The parent 
individual actually ceases to exist when the two new ones begin to exist ] 
Neither of the daughter cells is the same one, the same ontological 
individual, as the parent cell , though they are genetically identical to the 
parent cell. The zygote becomes two independent cells, two living 
individuals, each of which begins a new life-cycle within the zona pel/ucida, 
a protective cover composed of non-living glyco-proteins in non-cellular 
form. The zygote could not be a human person if it is not the same 
continuing individual entity as the first two cells after the first mitotic 
division. The evidence does not support the view that the zygote itself 
continues as one living individual with the same central organization after 
the first mitotic division. Two contiguous identical cells do not constitute 
one living individual. The required continuity of ontological identity from 
zygote to early embryo is not there, and much less from zygote to fetus , 
infant, and human adult. 
A Human Person Present Before Definitive Individuation? 
Each human adult has a body with millions of cells , but IS also a 
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multicellular human individual. If I am right, sometime after the two-cell 
stage a living human individual must be formed . This is often referred to as 
individuation. With the second mitotic division there are four distinct, 
contiguous, genetically identical cells within the zona pellucida. Each lives 
and behaves as an individual , drawing on nutrients from its cytoplasm and 
the surrounding fluids to provide its energy requirements. 
At the four-cell stage, each cell is still totipotent, i.e. , given a favorable 
environment, each has the capacity to generate the cell progeny required for 
the complete individual human offspring. Soon after this stage totipotency 
is restricted to groups of cells. Evidence for this may be had from the 
phenomenon of identical twinning which in the human may occur naturally 
anytime from the two cell stage up to the appearance of the primitive streak, 
about 14 days after fertilization. If a genetically unique human zygote is not 
the same ontological individual as one or both of its identical daughter cells , 
it could not be so for the resulting blastocyst , fetus and child , 
notwithstanding the continuity of the same biological identity at each stage 
of development. Genetic identity of human cells must not be confused with 
the ontological identity of human individuals. Human twins may be 
genetically identical but they are certainly distinct ontological individuals. 
Intercellular communication and cell differentiation begin to appear in 
the human from about the eight-cell stage onwards, but especially after the 
cells compact to form a cluster of cells called a morula. This maximizes cell 
surface contact. Some argue that these goal-directed activities are a sign the 
early human embryonic cells already have the requisite ongoing unity 
required for the actual constitution of a human individual. Goal directed 
activities of cells, however, are perfectly compatible with a multiplicity of 
cells that are distinct individuals . Think of the continuous goal directed 
activities of the sperm from its binding to the surface of the zona pellucida 
to penetration and the complete fusion of both gametes to form a new 
individual cell at syngamy. Nobody suggests the sperm bound to the outside 
of the zona pellucida constitutes a new cell to form a zygote . Intercellular 
goal directed activities alone do not prove the cells constitute a living 
multicellular individual. 
The occupation by some cells of an inner or outer position in the morula 
plays a great part in determining differentiation and consequently cells' 
developmental pathways and final destiny. These chance factors do have 
some bearing on differentiation and the formation of the definitive 
individual by activating certain genes and not others . The flexibility of 
movement and allocation of cells as distinct entities argues strongly against 
the morula being a single human individual. 
Experiments with mice show how single cells taken from three separate 
early mouse embryos can be aggregated to form a single viable chimeric 
mouse with characteristics of all three parent embryos. The three gentically 
dissimilar cells and their progeny collaborated to form the chimeric mouse . 
In this case , the resultant chimeric mouse certainly did not begin at the 
zygote stage . This suggests that in the normal situation. genetically similar 
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cell progency of a zygote subsequently form the definitive individual body, 
be it that of a mouse or a human individual. 
Prior to the early blastocyst stage, the developing cells do not 
differentiate sufficiently to determine which cells will form the 
extraembryonic membranes (e.g. , placenta) and those which will form the 
inner cell mass, from which will develop the embryo proper and fetus. 
Animal experiments show that by the late blastocyst stage when the inner 
cell mass is already formed, it is not yet determined which cells' progeny will 
give rise to the definitive embryo proper which will develop and grow into 
the fetus. A human individual could not be present before it is actually 
formed. The traditional insight over the centuries remains ever valid: a 
potential human individual cannot be an actual human individual. There 
can be no person before the formation of a distinct on-going individual 
human body. 
A Human Person Begins with the Formation of the Primitive Streak? 
With the appearance of the primitive streak at the completion of 
implantation some 14 days after fertilization a symmetrical body plan along 
the craniocaudal axis for every human individual is established, including 
cases of identical twinning. The multicellular human individual formed at 
this stage remains the same ongoing human being without loss of identity 
until death . The primitive streak represents the formation of a definitive 
individual and the restriction of the developmental potency of the zygote's 
cell progeny to the building up of a single individual in all eutherian 
mammals , including humans. Consequently identical twinning can no 
longer occur after this stage. Conjoined identical twins are formed if two 
primitive streaks in part develop as one. 
Prior to this stage, it seems unreal to speak of the presence of a distinct 
human individual. This suggests that before this stage, genetically human 
embryonic cells could not form an ongoing human individual with a true 
human nature. In short, I argue in my book that one or more human 
individuals could not actually exist before one or more human bodies are 
formed . I further argue that once the human individual is formed , a human 
being with a rational nature is constituted by the creative power of God. 
Not all will agree with my thesis and much time may be required for the 
truth to emerge with certainty. The zygote has the genetic code and 
organization required for the eventual formation of one or more human 
individuals, but this does not suffice to constitute an actual human 
individual , despite the continuity of genetic identity. Life may be a 
continuous process, but distinct individuals do begin and end their lives. 
Though the debate is far from over, it appears fertilization is not the 
beginning of the development of the human individual. but rather, 
represents the beginning of the process of the zygote's cell progeny 
becoming one or more human individuals. 
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4 Some Moral Implications of My Thesis 
I agree with the teaching of"Humanae Vitae" that the Creator's plan for 
the responsible transmission of human life as the fruit of an act of conjugal 
love should not be intentionally frustrated . Hence even if it were certain that 
the early human embryo was not a person, I would morally disapprove of 
interrupting the generative process by aborting preimplanted huma n 
embryos and destructive experiments on human embryos. 
In cases of rape , it is morally permissi ble to prevent conception 4 Hence it 
is necessa ry to know how long after the attack it is morally permissible to 
attempt to prevent conception as distinct from destroying or aborting the 
early human embryo to prevent pregnancy. If my thesis were to be proven 
to be correct, it would be necessary to di stinguish between homicidal a nd 
non-homicidal abortion. This does not imply any moral support for 
fornication or contraception against the teaching of "Humanae Vitae" or 
for any form of abortion, even if the malice of homicide is absent. At the 
same time it would be necessary to distinguish the kind of moral ma lice 
invo lved in each of these cases, especially in difficult pastoral counseling 
situations. In the mea ntime the benefit of a ny reasonable doubt about the 
persona l status of the early human embryo must be resolved by trea ting the 
human embryo as a person from conception . 
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